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1. Overview
1.1 Abstract
This study examines the relationship between company management guidance, and
ex-ante crash risk over the duration of the 2008(Jan 2006-Dec 2009) financial crisis
using the implied volatility skew, which is based upon ex ante volatility implied by
the pricing model developed by Black-Scholes (1973). The study finds that over the
duration of this crisis period, management guidance decreases with a rise in ex-ante
crash risk. Further the study provides evidence on the relationship of management
guidance and earnings volatility, and how that is affected by firm concentration and
industry.

1.2 Introduction
Looking at the statistical relationship between guidance from company
management and ex-ante stock price crash risk is important to the field of finance
due to the fact that it will help in understanding and managing investors fear after a
large stock price crash has occurred. This is important to look at because a largescale decline in stock price is the loss of a substantial amount of asset value beyond
what it’s valued at on a company’s balance sheet, Blanchard (2009). Due to money
multiplier effect Blanc & Peterson (2012), the loss of significant asset value
following a stock price crash risk is much larger than its monetary value to
company. For example, when accounting for the jobs that could have been created
from a percentage of that loss asset value, or accounting for the long run jobs that
could have been created from the next big product that may not be developed by a
2

company due to the fact that a stock experienced a stock price crash risk, that may
be attributed to the way in which a company’s management discloses information to
the market. In this study, the results are relevant to standard setters who stress it as
their role and responsibility to help nurture and restore investor confidence (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). The restoration of investor confidence
is crucial if the economic longevity of the United States of America is to be assured.
It is essential to bring retail investors back into the financial system, if they are too
distrustful of the market to even participate it in it then the economic wheels that
deployed capital in the U.S. will cease to turn.
This study will add to the literature that attempts to link ex-ante crash risk to
financial reporting. Most recently in the last couple of years there have been
significant breakthroughs that have lead us to analyze and look for previously un
noticed contributors to a stock price crash. Kim and Zhang (2014) document that ex
ante crash risk increases with the presence of financial restatements and internal
control weaknesses. And even more recently J.-B. Kim et all (2016) that find high
comparability is associated with low ex ante crash risk , even after controlling for
various aspects of reporting quality or transparency. In this respect the study adds
to the understanding of the linkage between ex-ante crash risk and managements
guidance activity. This report shows that there is a negative effect upon
management guidance, and perceived stock price crash risk using the implied
volatility skew1. The exploration of a linkage between the implied volatility skew

The option smirk curve is an indicator of investors' expected crash risk (Dumas et al., 1998; Bates, 2000).
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and management guidance has yet to be analyzed, and this study will hopefully
encourage more analysis upon various risk proxies in the derivatives market and
their effect upon a company’s management.
This study will also add to the literature that focuses on manager’s
asymmetric disclosure of good versus bad news. The prior studies done by Jin and
Myers (2006) conclude that managers tend to systematically withhold bad news.
Once again, one of the more recent studies done by J.-b. kim et al (2016) suggests
that financial statement comparability, can also disincline mangers from
withholding bad news. This study will contribute to this field of finance by
confirming the fact that management tends to withhold bad news, and further
showing that even in cases when management can’t for see a macro-economic shock
that will be materially impactful upon their earnings, management will tend to
withhold giving guidance. However, depending upon an industries concentration,
using the HHI index 2, this study finds that for the observed crisis period overall
earnings volatility isn’t statically significant to management guidance when
considering all the companies in our sample set3, even in the presence of macroeconomic event such as the financial crisis of 2008.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2. Reviews the
related literature and further explains the hypothesis. Section 3. Describes the

2. product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI).
3. Thomson Reuters’ First Call Historical Database (FCHD) was the initial data set that was used
to pull potential companies
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research process and data collection methods. Section 4 presents the main empirical
results and is where robustness checks are performed. Section 5 reports the results
for additional tests that were performed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background, related literature, and empirical prediction
2.1 Financial statement comparability
The purpose of financial reporting is to provide market participants with
relevant and meaningful information. The FASB (2010) states that this is
accomplished when a company’s financial statement can be easily compared with
similar reporting companies. There have been numerous studies done in the last
five years to test empirically the development of new proxies for comparability. (e.g.
Barth et al.; 2012, Gong et al, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Kim et. Al., (2013). The general
theme of these studies is that higher financial statement comparability leads to
easier interpretations for investors, and ultimately the identification of firm specific
risks.
2.2 Ex ante crash risk
It is important to examine ex ante crash risk perceived by investors, because
a lack of investor confidence is one of the key reasons of price declines during the
2008 financial crisis. Research has shown that perceived fear by investors of a
pending stock price crash, can have a snowball effect and continue the price decline.
Blanchard (2009) concluded that even though crash risk is significant, it is the task
of removing the perception of crash risk that is most important in restoring and
preventing the further declining of asset values during a market meltdown.
Research done by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) outline that because realized stock
5

price crash events are rare, it is then the fear of these “black swan” events that has
caused the majority of stock price crash’s. However, the majority of financial
research conducted in this field has a focus on ex post-realized. In this case of
examining ex-ante stock price crash risk, means the use of the volatility smirk, which
is based off the Black-Scholes model (1973). The use of the implied volatility smirk
in this study is due to a simple reason; the iv smirk is an ex ante measurement of
risk and is then utilized before actually executing making investment decision.
Research performed with the utilization of the iv smirk to measure and gauge risk,
include Bollen and Whaley (2004); Van Buskirk (2011); Kim and Zhang (2014).
Bates (2008) states, the option market could be functioning as an insurance market
such that OTM put options act as a hedge against future stock price crashes.
2.3 Link between management guidance and ex-ante implied volatility
The analysis of the studies performed with this may questions attributes firspecific stock price crash risk to the dumping of bad news previously hoarded by
managers (Black and Liu, 2007; Hutton et al. 2009). The model created by Jim and
Myers (2006) concludes that managers have incentives to withhold bad information
due to their concern about employment, compensation, reputation etc. When this
bad news accumulates enough overtime, when it is released upon the market it
causes a large and abrupt stock price crash to occur. Another A study conducted by
Kim et al. (2011) show a positive association between tax avoidance and crash risk,
the study argues that tax avoidance activities facilitate bad news hoarding which
increases the likelihood of stock price crashes. A study performed by Bradshaw et al.
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(2010) finds that when measuring firm opacity with absolute discretionary accruals
it is positively associated with the steepness of the implied volatility smirk.

This study examines the statistical relationship between management
guidance, and perceived ex-ante stock price crash risk. As discussed in the previous
section this study adds onto the previous literature associated with financial
statement comparability by highlighting the need for a potential observable
measure with regards to financial statement reporting specifically, and how
financial statement comparability could help mitigate the drastic stock price crashes
that often occur due to managerial earnings management tactics. This paper
proposes that a statistic that would signal the acknowledgement of an unforeseen
macro-economic shock that was materially relevant to their financial statements. An
indicator variable that would accomplish such a feat would have to be composed of
a linguistic scan of every recorded/publically disclosed earnings guidance given by
the current company management. The variable would then go onto further slim
down the potential list of acceptable companies, by excluding companies whose
management haven’t acknowledge/ given guidance with reference to a
macroeconomic shock. This indicator variable would allow for the further
researching into the skill level of a companies management, but more importantly
allows for the further diversification at the firm level statistically for clustering. The
reason being is that management that has never admitted a mistake or an error with
regards to their forecasting ability, are effected characteristically differently at the
firm level with regards to fixed effects/ random effects. This is because a company
7

who won’t acknowledge the relevancy of an observable or potential macroeconomic shock to their earnings period is at the firm level promoting a culture of
shortsightedness. This area of research has been touched on by several studies and
(Kale et al., 1991; Chan et al., 2001) concluded that there was positive relationship
between high outcome uncertainty and abnormal earnings, cash flow, and stock price
return volatility that inevitably increases the opportunity for the variables leading to cause
a stock price crash. A variable, that with some development could potentially serve as a
proxy for the variable that I described, is the STRATEGY variable developed by Bentley
et al. (2013) helps to differentiate between the various business strategies of companies.
This study adds on to the previous field of ex-ante crash risk and the linkage
between ex-ante expected crash risk and management guidance. The analysis of this
study focuses the time period of observation over the duration of the 2008(Jan
2006-Dec 2009) financial crisis4. This period of volatility also has a clear economic
and meaningful economic study adds onto financial literature that over the duration
of this crisis period, management guidance decreases with a rise in ex-ante crash
risk. Further the study provides evidence on the relationship of management
guidance and earnings volatility, and how that is affected by firm concentration and
industry.
Hypothesis: There will be a statistically significant relationship between
management guidance, and the implied volatility skew. If there is a relationship
between these two variables, then there will be a significant relationship as well

This period also coincides best with the option data that was able to be gathered,
without being able to use the Option Metrics data service
4
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between management guidance, and a firm level variable (e.g. earnings volatility)
only during periods when there is an unforeseen economic shock, that could
potentially have a material effect upon earnings (via. versa depending on HHI
characteristics.
3. Research Process
3.1 Data Collection Methods
The usual data package, Option Metrics, which is utilized by most studies to
conduct statistical analysis with derivatives data, was not available as a resource at
Claremont McKenna College. Therefore in order to acquire an IV Skew variable, it
was required to build a macro in excel that used the Bloomberg Plug-in to pull the
options pricing data for the required ATM calls and OTM puts. However, another
hurdle that was encountered after the pricing data was collected, was the format of
the pricing data. The way that the Bloomberg Pricing function is constructed, only a
horizontal output can be generated. In order to then import this pricing data into
stata it was necessary to reformat the Bloomberg data. Besides the Bloomberg data,
all other data was collected fro Compustat, WRDS, and CRSP.
3.2 Measuring Implied ex-ante crash Risk
This study uses the terms implied volatility smirk, volatility smirk, and implied
volatility skew interchangeably. I will use a direct computational method in order
compute an implied volatility smirk which will function as a proxy for perceived stock
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crash risk. The steepness of the option smirk curve will be suitable as an indicator of
investor’s perceived firm-specific risk, as shown in the work done by (dumas et al., 1998;
Bates, 2000). The first step to determine the correct combination of options to use in
order to calculate the volatility smirk, it is necessary to group options into moneyness
categories. Following the work done by (Bollen and Whaley, 2004; Kim and Zhang, 2014)
the options will be grouped into five different moneyness categories according to their

delta values. 5

I then follow the work performed

by (Kim and Zhang, 2004) in order to come up with the formula to calculate the implied
volatility skew. This means measuring the daily implied volatility skew of stock I’s option
as the difference between the implied volatility of OTM puts and that of ATM calls
during day t. When there are multiple put or call option contracts for stock I on a
particular day, I will calculate the weighted average of the implied volatilities for the put
or call option, using option open interest as a weight. Then in order to obtain an annual

5

The value of the option delta is between 0.375 and 0.625 (denoted ATMC) or between 0.375 and 0.125
(denoted OTMP). We also used a duration of 90 days for the basis of the options, to calculate each
IV_Skew
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measure of the volatility smirk, following the work of Kim and Zhang (2014), I will
average the daily IV_Skew over the 12-month period ending three months after the
fiscal year-end. I then follow the work performed by Kim and Zhang (2004) in order to
come up with the formula to calculate the implied volatility skew. This will mean
measuring the daily implied volatility skew of stock I’s option as the difference between
the implied volatility of OTM puts and that of ATM calls during day t. 6

3.2 Measuring Management Opaqueness
The next step of this study will be to measure management opaqueness. This
study will combine the work of several key studies that look at the statistical
relationship between discretionary accruals and crash risk. Combining the key
takeaways from these previous studies, we will supplement the analysis of the activity
of management guidance pre-and post-event of a stock price crash. This analysis of the
activity of management with regards to providing guidance, with the addition of
previously proven measures of financial statement comparability, and with knowledge
of the effects of financial statement comparability on voluntary corporate disclosure of
bad news than to that of good news thanks to (Kothari et al., 2009) will allow us to
compute an indicator for management opaqueness. When starting any measurement of
management opaqueness, it is important to keep in mind the work done by Hutton et

6

Consistent with prior studies (Bollen and Whaley, 2004; Kim and Zhang, 2014), OTM puts are defined as
put options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.125 and ATM calls are defined as call options with a
delta value between 0.375 and 0.625.
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al. (2009). Hutton found that discretionary accruals are positively associated with crash
risk, suggesting that accounting opacity (lack of financial statement comparability)
enables managers to hoard bad news from outsiders. Recent studies by Bradshaw et al.
(2010), Kim et al (2011), and Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu (2015) provide evidence that financial
statement comparability reduces ex ante crash risk perceived by options market
participants and that investors recognize the predictive value of factors related to
financial statement transparency. Therefore, the first step in this measurement process
will be to determine the accounting opacity for each company. After looking at the
variables for comparability that were developed by (Kim et al, 2016), it is apparent that
the summation of the effects of management opacity is the issuance of guidance, or
not. Therefore, to measure management opaqueness, this study will use the frequency
of management guidance as a proxy7.
3.3. Determining if unforeseen Macro-Economic Shocks Affect Guidance
The next step of this research will then be to determine the causations in the
instances where the statistical relationship between management opaqueness
(management guidance) and various firm level indicators (e.g. earnings, stock return)
valid. My thesis is that in these instances where the relationship is valid (via. versa
depending on HHI) there will be the presence of macro-economic factors affected by
the passage of time since it is not held fixed in this period, which will explain the failing

The frequency of management guidance is pulled from CRSP; this study doesn’t
include non-numerical (descriptive) guidance issued by company management.
7
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of the statistical relationship. This non fixed effects essentially allows the time variable
to account for the different lagged macro economic factors which have a huge effect
on each different companies earnings performance. When looking at certain
companies during the times around mi-2005 the macroeconomic effects of the Chinese
stock index dropping should be present in certain sectors, as well as during mid 2006
which was the official top of the US housing bubble should produce negative
externalities that will impact certain sectors that have companies which consist of our
data set. These macro-economic factors will impact the firm level indicators that affect
management guidance in a negative or positive direction, determined by the new
perception investors have with regards of Management's ability to determine the
relevancy of large macro-economic trends/events. If this is proven true by this study,
then there should be an inverse relationship, between high concentrated product
industries (banks, financial institutions, etc)8 and low concentrated product industries
(furniture manufacturing, etc). This inversion in the periods of which high concentrated
& low concentrated, each care about a firm level indicator in theory will be due to the
statistical relationship between guidance from company management in high vs. low
concentrated industries as discovered 9. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Giroud and
Mueller, 2010, 2011), product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–

High concentrated product industries for this study include, any company within
the First Call Dataset that has starts with a “6”, and that have at least 252
observations for the IV_Skew observation,
9 Competition improves the flow of firm-specific information (Hart, 1983; Nalebuff and
Stiglitz, 1983), which may deter managers' from hiding bad news, and via versa for low
competition markets
8
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Hirschman index (HHI). In order to make sure that the study is properly validating any
statistical relationship with stock price crash risk and management skill, it is necessary
to have an adequate amount of controls. So far along in this process the planned
controls to use will consist of implied volatility (of an at the money call option) call,
cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, sales volatility, leverage, and total volatility. The
final empirical method that will be implanted will be the manipulation of various
control variables in order to capture any relationship between management
opaqueness and ex-ante stock price crash risk. The work done by Dennis and Mayhew
(2002) will aid in making sure that ATM implied volatility should be controlled because
of its effect on expected crash risk. The work done by Pastor and Veronese (2003)
suggests that certain aspects of a firm’s profitability will have interaction with the stock
return volatility. Therefore, including several operating measures that have statistical
significance measuring operating uncertainties, such as cash flow, earnings, and sales
volatility will suffice. The last stage of this part of my empirical methods will consist of
using a correlation matrix in order to draw my inferences upon the results of this study.
3.4 Empirical Model
The empirical model that will be used to try and correctly capture/analyze the
relationship between management guidance, and ex-ante implied crash risk will be a
generalized least squares. The reasoning behind using a generalized least squares
technique is to allow for the random effects that are generated by a macro-economic
shock to properly be measured.
14

Peterson (2005) best describes the reasoning behind a GLS regression, and the
benefits of using such, “When the residuals of a panel regression are correlated,
not only OLS standard error estimates are biased but also the coefficient
estimates are inefficient (the estimates do not exploit all of the information in
the data). Researchers can improve efficiency by estimating a random effects
model using a GLS approach (i.e., a panel data set with an unobserved firm
effect, see Wooldridge, 2007). This is rarely done in the finance literature. Less
than 3% of the papers in the survey used this method ” 1011
Additional evidence for using a random effects model vs. a fixed effects model is
provided by McManus (2011),
“If we can assume that the unobserved heterogeneity will not bias the estimates:
Fixed effects methods are inefficient. They throw away information. Pooled OLS
is inefficient because it does not exploit the autocorrelation in the composite
error term. Random effects methods use feasible GLS estimation (RE FGLS) to
exploit within-cluster correlation. Random effects estimation is more efficient
than FE or OLS. The “random effects assumption” of no bias due to Ci more
stringent”

For examples, see Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Gentry, Kemsley, and Mayer, 2003;
and Almazan et al., 2004)
11 Panel data are a type of longitudinal data, or data collected at different points in
time.
10
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Therefore my empirical equation will built with the following assumptions, outlined by
McManus (2011): Assume the errors are correlated within each unit, that the errors are
uncorrelated across units, and that the variance in the composite errors is equal to the
sum of the variances in the unobserved effect and the idiosyncratic error.

Therefore my empirical equation will be:
Y(management guidance)2
=𝜎 ! 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚

𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜎 ! 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)

Section 4. Main Empirical Results
For this paper I divided the time period into four periods following: three periods: Gen.
Crisis: (August 2006-December 9th, 2009), Pre-crisis (August 2006–July 2007); Crisis I
(August 2007–July 2008); and Crisis II (August 2008– December 2008). The Pre-crisis
period is the year leading up to the collapse of the credit boom. Crisis I starts with the
collapse of the subprime market in the summer of 2007. Crisis II begins in August 2008
when CDS spreads of financial institutions start rising and it covers the period of greatest
concerns about the liquidity and solvency of the financial system (the banking panic).
Crisis III begins in September 2008- December 9th, 2009. (Scharfstein, 2010). The final
step in the data analysis process was to winserize the variables, and insert a lag to allow
for the proper interaction between all the variables.
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Table A. 1

Gen. Crash

Pre-Crash

CP1

CP2

CP3
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Fig. A.1
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Fig. A.2
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Fig. A.3
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Table B.1

Gen. Crisis

Pre-Crisis

CP1

CP2

CP3
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Fig. B.1.
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Fig.B.2.

Fig.B.3.
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Table C.1

Gen. Crisis

Pre-Crisis

CP1

CP2

CP3
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Fig.C.1
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Fig.C.2

26

Fig.C.3.
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Table A.1 shows first a regression run by generalized least squares, of all the companies
contained within the data set. Generalized least square is the best method to perform a
statistical analysis due to the present of temporary effects. Generalized least Squares is
the preferred technique for allowing the random effects with regards to time, to effect
the data as shown by (Peterson, 2008). Allowing for the effect of a variable not
contained within the regression is a strategy this is ideal for this situation. After running
this regression I double checked the robustness of the results by performing an analysis
of the residuals of the results for firms that were clustered by Permno, and then when
first were clustered by quarter. There were differences in the residuals therefore the
statistics are statistically robust for this regression. I think created an interaction
variable based off the company being a bank or not, since this was one of the hardest
and most effected industries during the financial crisis. This was significant all the way
up to worst period of the financial crisis showing that being a bank up to this time
period you were less likely to issue guidance, and on average this effected guidance
negatively from 5 to 8 occurrences. The quarter variable in this regression is significant
through out the whole duration of the study showing that time is something that is an
influence when it comes to company management. The interaction variable between
banks and quarter was significant in general for the whole crisis time period. However,
when breaking down the sub units of time for this variable it failed to be significant
during crisis period one which shows that during the start of a recession it wasn’t
significant if you were a bank vs. regular companies if you were going to give guidance.
The next variable for concern is the lagged IV_Skew, which is the proxy for perceived
28

stock market crash risk. This was significant throughout the whole study showing that
this has a strong statistical relationship with management guidance. The relationship
between the IV_skew and management guidance is a negative relationship, which
shows that management is unlikely to release guidance as the perceived stock price
crash risk rises. The variable leverage is statistically insignificant through out the whole
regression process. The variable twelve trailing return is significant through out the
whole regression. This shows that management guidance is aware, and effected by the
performance of their company’s stock price within the last year. This relationship shows
that as the company does better management is less likely to release guidance. The
variable market cap is statically significant across the whole regression, and has a
positive statistically significant relationship with management guidance. This shows that
as a company is larger and larger in market cap, they are more and more likely to issue
guidance. The earnings volatility is statistically insignificant throughout the whole
regression, however it is significant within the various sub time periods. All the way up
to the worst part of the crisis period CP2, earnings volatility is significant. This shows
that up till the point of the worst period in the crisis, this was a significant variable. This
is due to the relationship that this variable has with banks and manufacturing
companies. This is because of the tendency of companies to release guidance base on
their industry concentration, this is touched on by (Hannan, 1997). This observation
upon the behavior of earnings volatility is what drives my next two-subunit analysis/
additional test. The variable sales volatility is statically significant throughout the entire
regression. This shows that management is likely to issue guidance when sales volatility
29

rises. This is due to the fact, that industry analysts will recognize any major disruption
the sales process, and promotes the early release of bad news, as mentioned in section
2. The crash variable is statistically significant throughout the entire regression, showing
that during the crisis period if a company experienced a stock price crash they were
likely to issue guidance. Overall, table a.1 shows that there is a statically significant
relationship between management guidance, and perceived stock price crash risk. The
results in Table A.1 lead me to believe that it was necessary to further inspect the
relationship between the firm level variables and management guidance. I will direct my
analysis on the fluctuation of significance between earnings volatility.
5.1. Additional Analysis
To further investigate the relationship between management guidance, and implied
volatility skew I performed an analysis of the data again using generalized least squares
in this case. Table A.2 includes the results from a GLS regression run only on data
included from a bank, (This was done by sorting the data by SIC). This analysis was run
in order to account for random effects and exclude any bias. Based on the results we
determine that ln_mark~p, twelve_~t and sale_vol are all significant through each
quarter tested. This indicates that they are all parameters that banks take into
consideration when issuing management guidance. That said, the predictor leverage is
insignificant for the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. This would imply that leverage is not
a major indicator for banks when issuing management guidance. Additionally, earn_vol
(the predictor for earnings volatility) is significant in the pre-crisis period but is
insignificant in the last quarter. This indicates that banks were concerned with earnings
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volatility before and during the crash. However, in the subsequent quarters after the
crash, they became less concerned with including earnings volatility as a parameter for
management guidance in a time of crisis. This is a relevant finding because it provides
empirical evidence that banks are less concerned with earnings volatility after a crisis,
and only during a time where inadequate management skill could be used to potentially
blame them for failing to see the effect/potential effect of a macro-economic shock.
After seeing the statistical pattern relationship shown in Table B.1 there is a clear
need to look at the relationship for management guidance, and other firm level variables
with regards to a low concentrated industry. Therefore, for this last regression I dropped
all companies that didn’t have “25” starting their SIC #. This drops all the companies
except those involved in the manufacturing sector, specifically those that focus on
making home furniture items etc. Table C.1 show the output results of another GLS
regression excluding the data from banks (i.e. only including manufacturing-industry
data). For the general crisis period, twelve-month earnings, market cap and sales
volatility are all significant indicators in management guidance. Additionally, earnings
volatility is significant by a narrow margin (0.0405). However, the most interesting part of
this regression is how earnings volatility for manufacturing companies, act oppositely
with regards to statistical significance than financial companies who are in a more
concentrated industry, which has been shown by earlier studies to have a negative
statically relationship with guidance. Earnings volatility not being significant during the
CP2 for manufacturing companies shows that the market, and management were
concerned with it only after the CP1 had begun, because the macro-economic shock
was directly involved in this sector such as with the financial institutions. Also in this
output, we observe that leverage is insignificant for every quarter tested. The crash
variable is significant after the CP2showing that, a company experiencing a stock price
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crash, and being a manufacturing company during this time was likely to issue guidance
after the market realized the initial shock had be realized. Crash quarter is significant
every period except during the start of the crisis at CP1 showing that during this time
period, the management recognized that their company could be hit materially from the
impact in the other sectors of the economy. The lagged IV_Skew variable is once again
significant through the overall regression period and within the sub units of time, showing
that manufacturing management does care about the perceived stock price crash risk by
the market. Once again a negative statistical relationship is observed between stock
price crash risk and management guidance. Leverage once again is insignificant to the
management guidance. The several variables, sales volatility, twelve month return and
market cap once again have statistical significance with management guidance, and in
this case both variables are positively correlated with management guidance.

VI. Conclusion
In conclusion this study shows that there is a statically significant relationship
between, management guidance and implied stock price crash risk for a company.
Looking further at the additional results for the study, I can conclude that when company
management doesn’t foresee an unexpected macro economic shock, they then are
concerned about potentially being responsible for the failing to see the pitfall. This fear of
being exposed for not understanding larger macro economic trends then leads
management to try and withhold this guidance. However, management with holding
guidance due to a failure to foresee an economic shock, only leads to the build up of bad
information, which previous studies have shown causes the majority of stock price
crashes and not actual major market crashes. Hopefully, this paper encourages further
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research into the use of the implied volatility skew, and management guidance behavior
during the financial crisis.
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